A.I.C.

THE ABDUCTION EXPERIENCE: A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THEORY AND EVIDENCE

Part 3

 STUART APPELLE

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PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

Disorders that might account for false abduction experiences or their associated symptomatology include psychosis (hallucinations and delusions), folie à deux (shared psychotic symptoms brought about by a close relationship between the percipients), conversion reactions (physiological manifestations of a psychosomatic nature; for example, marks, blotches, and discolorations of the skin), dissociative disorders (amnesia, fugue, and other conditions resulting in time loss and distortion, disorientation, and unaccounted-for wanderings), multiple personality disorder (which in addition to missing time may be characterized by messages from and/or dual identities with specific "others"), and Munchausen syndrome (self-inflicted injury or false claims of physical symptomatology).

Psychopathology can be assessed according to a mental health practitioner's clinical impression (based on intake interview, clinical history, or diagnosis as evolved in the course of therapy), or on the basis of standardized tests. Both approaches have been used in evaluating abduction experiencers. Regardless of the method of assessment, it should be emphasized that abnormality must be established independent of abduction phenomenology itself. For example, Schnabel (1994) describes similarities between the purported experiences of an alleged abduction victim and the symptomatology of dissociative disorders. On the basis of these similarities the reader is asked to assume that the reported abduction experiences are caused by dissociative disorders. However, because the subject is never actually diagnosed as dissociative, Schnabel's argument is based not on a formal test for pathology, but on an appeal to parsimony.

Even when formal tests are used, their interpretation is compromised by the fact that they may fail to distinguish between dissociative tendencies and dissociative effects. For example, Powers (I 994a) assessed a group of abduction experiencers on the Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) subscale of the MMPI, and on the Perceptual Alteration Scale (PAS). PTSD is correlated with dissociative tendencies. The PAS, another measure of dissociation, evaluates behavior in the domains of control, self-monitoring, concealment, consciousness, and sensory experience. Powers found a clear correlation between abduction experiences and elevated PTSD and PAS scores.

Although Powers was primarily concerned with the implications of these results for therapy, it is clear from her discussion that dissociative phenomenology was considered only as a possible cause of the abduction experience and not as a possible effect. But anyone experiencing an actual abduction by aliens might be expected to have elevated scores on the measures assessed. Indeed, in mundane cases of documented trauma (victims of rape, terrorism, witnessing an atrocity) elevated scores on the kind of measures used by Powers are both expected and obtained (Wilson, 1990).

(a) Assessments of Pathology

Clinical Impression. In some studies, diagnosis is not based on any standardized test for pathology, but on assessment interview, behavioral observation, and impression of the abduction experiencer's subjective account. For example, Mack (1994) studied 76 abduction experiencers, and provides case studies of 13. However, noting that "a full battery of psychometric tests is time consuming and expensive" (p. 17), Mack had only four of his 76 cases formally tested for psychiatric disorder (one had already been hospitalized for psychiatric reasons; the other three tested normal).

Other studies do employ psychological tests, but diagnosis is still largely subjective. For example, Bloecher, Clamar, and Hopkins (1985) discuss the findings of Slater (1985), a psychologist who did a blind evaluation of nine abduction experiencers. Slater found no evidence by which the reported abduction experiences could be accounted for on the basis of a mental disorder. However, the tests used to evaluate pathology were projective tests (Rorschach, Thematic Apperception Test), the validity of which is particularly dependent "on the somewhat esoteric skills" (Carson & Butcher, 1992) of the individual administering them. Although there is no reason to question Slater's skills in this regard, the fact remains that the conclusions of this study are based on the interpretation of a single individual.

Jacobson and Bruno (1994) collected extensive narrative data on the personal histories and abduction experiences of twelve individuals. Based on clinical impression, they found that none of the narratives contained elements that would suggest "the phenomenology of any currently recognized psychiatric syndrome" (p. 306). Nevertheless, hospital records showed that two of their subjects had suffered from a major psychiatric illness around the time of their abduction experience. This illustrates the danger in using clinical impression by itself as the method of assessment.

Each of these studies provides suggestive data, but each is limited in terms of methodology. Regardless of the efficacy of these approaches for the clinic, their usefulness as research data is compromised by lack of repeatability (because of the lack of standardized measurement, or the dependence of diagnostic outcome on the person doing the diagnosis), the absence of control subjects, and/or the small sample sizes studied.

Standardized tests for pathology. More extensive studies using standardized instruments have been carried out by a number of investigators. Parnell and Sprinkle (1990) tested over 200 subjects reporting UFO experiences on the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), a psychometric instrument that is sensitive to psychopathology. Although the authors conclude that "no overt psychopathology was indicated" (p. 45), a closer examination of their data suggests that among those subjects who described communication with entities, some had scores on certain MMPI subscales (e.g., scale 8 -- the subscale assessing schizophrenic tendency) that could be considered in the abnormal range.

In a similar study, Rodeghier et al. (1992) used the MMPI R (revised version of the MMPI) to evaluate a group of abduction experiencers selected according to a much more strict definition of "experiencer" than that used by Parnell and Sprinkle. Again, no overt pathology was indicated for the group as a whole, but was suggestive for certain individuals in the sample.

Spanos et al. (1993) compared a group of control subjects to 49 individuals who had reported UFO-related experiences. The UFO reporters were divided into subjects who merely saw unidentified lights and those who had more elaborate close encounters. To assess psychological health, a battery of tests was administered (the schizophrenia subscale of the MMPI, Rosenberg's Self-Esteem Scale, the Magical Ideation Scale, the Perceptual Aberration Scale, Tellegen's Differential Personality Questionnaire). The authors found that their encounter subjects scored no lower on any measure of psychological health than the controls, and had higher psychological health scores than the controls on many of the measurements. They conclude that "these findings provide no support whatsoever for the hypothesis that UFO reporters are psychologically disturbed" (p. 628), and "the onus is on those who favor the psychopathology hypothesis to provide support for it" (p. 629).

Clinical and statistical "normality." Despite these findings, the implication of general normality can be quite misleading. "Normal" can be understood in the clinical sense as "not pathological," or in the statistical sense as "not significantly different from average." From a clinical perspective, the data so far are unambiguous. Most abduction experiences cannot be accounted for in terms of known psychological disorder as measured on standardized psychometric tests.

This notwithstanding, a number of studies have shown that abduction experiencers are not representative of the general population. For example, Parnell and Sprinkle (1990) found that subjects claiming communication with aliens had a propensity for unusual feelings, thoughts, and attitudes; were suspicious, distrustful, imaginative; and had schizoid tendencies. Ring and Rosing (1990) found that their subjects reported more sensitivity to nonordinary realities as children. Rodeghier et al. (1991) found more loneliness, less happiness, and poorer sleep. Mack (1994) reports being "struck by how many abductees came from broken homes or had one or more alcoholic parents" (p. 17). Perhaps most troubling, Stone-Carrnen (1994) found that 57% of her subjects reported suicide attempts earlier in life (compared with 1.28% in the general population).

PSYCHODYNAMIC THEORIES

It has been suggested (Sagan, 1996; Vallee, 1969) that similar themes appearing in both historical folklore (e.g., encounters with fairies, elves, angels) and contemporary abduction accounts indicate a common origin in the human psyche. (For a discussion of the folkloric dimensions of the abduction experience, see Bullard, 1991.) A number of psychodynamic theories8 have been proposed to explain the manifestation of these processes as the abduction experience. Common to these theories is the notion that abduction experiences are a product of the unconscious mind. The theories differ, however, in regard to their description of these unconscious processes or in regard to the situations deemed responsible for their activation.

(a) Screen Memories for Childhood Abuse

A correlation between reported abduction experiences and reported childhood abuse experiences has been consistently found by researchers and clinicians (Laibow, 1989; Powers, 1994a, 1994b; Ring & Rosing, 1990; Rodeghier et al., 1992). An obvious (although not necessarily correct) interpretation of this correlation is that actual occurrences of childhood abuse manifest as false memories of alien abduction.

For example, Powers (1994a) suggests that the abduction experience serves as a screen memory for childhood sexual abuse because abduction by aliens "is less stressful than confronting the trauma of childhood abuse perpetrated by relatives or family friends" (p. 49), and "recasting the experience [of early childhood abuse] as a selection with such a grand purpose [i.e., for the aliens' cosmic objectives] might restore meaning to lives threatened by traumatic memories" (Powers, 1994b, p. 46).

In support of this contention, Powers (1994a) argues that elevated PTSD and PAS scores found in both abduction experiencers and victims of childhood abuse imply that abduction experiencers are victims of childhood abuse. This she assumes because elevated scores on these scales are known to be a consequence of trauma. But why should they be regarded as any better evidence for the trauma of child abuse than the trauma of alien abduction? The answer, of course, appeals to parsimony, not evidence.

Nevertheless, a correlation between childhood abuse and the abduction experience is a persistent finding, and the implication that childhood abuse causes the abduction experience deserves careful examination. The argument's appeal to parsimony especially deserves scrutiny.

Consider the following psychodynamic assumptions that must underlie this interpretation:

(a) Alien abduction and examination procedures are inherently less traumatic than childhood abuse, and may even be conceptualized as benign;

(b) Among all possible forms that screen memories for child abuse might take, this particular motif is a reasonable and likely candidate;

(c) As screen memories of abuse, abduction experiences "work" (i.e., they are a successful psychodynamic strategy for protecting the victim from trauma); and

(d) Total blocking of traumatic memory is an established phenomenon.

Each of these assumptions is questionable. In regard to the first assumption, it is not at all apparent that abuse by aliens is less traumatic than abuse by humans. In fact, abduction experiences are almost universally reported as traumatic (at least initially). And as Wilson (1990) has pointed out, the denial of alien abductions by society is an additional stressor for those who would accept their experiences as veridical.

In regard to the second assumption (and given that abduction experiences are indeed traumatic), what psychodynamic mechanism predicts the substitution of one traumatic event as a screen memory for another? What psychodynamic mechanism accounts for the choice of such an implausible event for the screen memory?

In regard to the third assumption, not the least of the difficulties with the screen memory interpretation is that as a screen memory, the abduction experience doesn't work, at least not very well or very consistently. PTSD symptoms are common in the abduction experiencer population. Why are abduction experiences so specifically and consistently chosen by the unconscious to serve as screen memories when they are so ineffective in protecting the experiencer from stress?

Finally, the kind of powerful blocking of traumatic memory hypothesized to be operating in abuse cases (what Ofshe and Singer, 1994, call "robust repression") has been seriously questioned. Although it has been argued that a "tremendous volume of data available clearly support the existence of traumatic amnesia or robust repression" (American Society of Clinical Hypnosis, 1995, p. 8), Ofshe and Singer (1994) contend that in contrast to the traditional concept of repression as described in mainstream clinical theory, the mental mechanism for forgetting major, repeated, and complex life events has developed from neither analytic tradition nor empirical research. According to their review of the literature, despite the popularity of the concept:

A citation search of the clinical literature failed to turn up any proposal that this sort of powerful mental mechanism might exist for theoretical reasons nor did it reveal reports of empirical research demonstrating the mechanism's existence ... The speculation [about the existence of robust repression] and its rapid acceptance are linked to social change rather than to scientific progress. [Ofshe & Singer, 1994, pp. 396-97]

There are other problems for the screen-memory hypothesis. If the abduction experience is a screen memory, it must be explained why this memory itself remains repressed. It could be argued that it is called into play as a defense mechanism only when the memory of actual childhood abuse -- through hypnosis, therapy, or serendipity -- starts to become unrepressed. But this requires yet additional untested assumptions about the psychodynamics of repression. In other cases, memories of childhood abuse coexist with abduction memories (Laibow, 1989), presenting a similar difficulty for the screen-memory hypothesis.

Given these issues, the serious investigator must consider whether the requirements of the screen-memory interpretation indeed represent a parsimonious explanation for the abduction experience. (On the other hand, the above discussion should give no comfort to those who would argue, conversely, that childhood abuse is a screen memory for actual alien abductions; the identical problems in psychodynamic theory and logical argument apply.)

Ultimately, the relationship between reported experiences of childhood abuse and alien abductions may need to be explained in terms other than those of repression and screen memory. For example, several studies (Mukerjee, 1995) have shown that individuals subjected to childhood abuse have a smaller hippocampus than that of control subjects, and that a smaller hippocampus is correlated with more pronounced symptoms of PTSD and dissociation. The hippocampus is a part of the brain that deals with short-term memory and may be involved with storage and retrieval of long-term memories. Moreover, this part of the brain is strongly affected by cortisol, a hormone linked with emotional affect and disturbing memories. It is possible, therefore, that childhood abuse alters the brain in a way that predisposes the individual to dissociation and alterations in memory production and recall. Whether or not this underlies the link between childhood abuse and abduction experiences is yet to be studied.

(b) Birth Memories

Lawson (1984, 1985) argues that the abduction experience is the unconscious' representation of the birth experience. His theory stems from the psychodynamic speculations of Grof (1976), who noted perinatal imagery in subjects experiencing LSD hallucinations. Lawson sees perinatal imagery in abduction experiencers' descriptions of aliens (they are fetal in appearance), hallways and columns of light (which are considered symbolic of transport down the birth canal), the shape of the UFO or its rooms (these are womb-like), doors and other openings (cervix-like), and any alien equipment that is elongated, tubular, or flat-ended (which Lawson characterizes as umbilical or placental). Lawson (1985) even suggests that the reported experiences of missing time are memories of the effects of oxytocin, a hormone that initiates contractions and has been shown to produce apparent memory loss in laboratory animals. That is, according to Lawson, abduction amnesia is the "memory" of fetal "forgetting."

For those who might regard such analogies as strained, Lawson (1984) claims experimental support. He asked hypnotized subjects to imagine an alien abduction. The stories of eight subjects born by Cesarean section were compared with those of two subjects who were products of vaginal delivery. Nearly all the Cesarean subjects produced abduction accounts devoid of tunnel-like imagery.

Lawson regards this finding as consistent with his theory, but the strength of this conclusion is questionable. First, the analysis suffers from an inadequate sample size, a failure to independently verify the subjects' reported method of birth, a very limited criterion of birth-imagery, and a post hoc interpretation of narrative symbolism without any protocol for symbol-item selection or validation of interpreter reliability. In addition, like the Cesarean subjects, one of the two vaginally delivered subjects also reported no tunnellike imagery.

Second, much of the imagery referred to in Lawson's analysis is related to UFO entry, that is, subjects describing "being sucked up into the UFO as if through an extended tunnel" (p. 217). Thus, Lawson's analysis not only requires accepting the birth-memory construct per se, but also that the unconscious reverse the order in which the birth events occurred.

Finally, there is no compelling evidence that a physiological or cognitive substrate for birth memory even exists in the fetus or newborn. Although Lawson (1984) contends that "the factual accuracy of birth memories [is] ... sufficiently reliable" (p. 213), Grof himself acknowledged that "a causal nexus between the actual biological birth and the unconscious matrixes for these experiences remains to be established" (p.98).

(c) Abortion Anxiety

Stacy (1992) opines that the abduction experience, at least the commonly reported aspect (Jacobs, 1992) of the experience dealing with genetic breeding and hybrid babies, "is in fact a reliving of the abortion experience, whether the latter is actually real or 'merely' imaginary" (p. 4). More specifically, he regards it as:

an attempt to expatiate any lingering guilt associated with the [abortion]. The hybrid baby, in other words, is nothing less (or more) than the aborted fetus brought to life. The "missing" fetus is no longer dead, then, but lives on in a "heaven" (outer space) from which it can never physically return, perhaps even aboard a 'Mother' ship.... In a metaphorical sense the Grays are avenging angels. Allegorically, they represent the souls of all departed, or aborted, fetuses. And the fact that the Grays are now responsible for the "missing" fetus ... absolves the aborter of . . . guilt. . . . The abduction experience, then, serves a fundamental purpose, namely, the reduction of psychological tension occasioned by guilt. [Stacy, 1992, p. 41

Stacy argues that this theory makes sense even where the abduction experience continues to be a source of stress, because stress may be less aversive than guilt. He also argues that the "archetypal architecture" of his abduction/abortion scenario applies not only to women who have experienced abortion, but to women who have never experienced an abortion (they are still members of a society conflicted by abortion's moral implications) and to men (who may share with women the psychological conflict associated with the abortion issue). And since the theory suggests unconscious processes, the abduction experiencer need not ever be aware of abortion anxiety.

Stacy's theory casts a wide net, but this is both a strength and a weakness. While it can account for diversity within the abduction experiencer population, it is difficult to imagine anyone who could not be a candidate for Stacy's hypothesized abortion anxiety (except perhaps very young children). In any case, systematic tests of this hypothesis are yet to be carried out.

(d) The Collective Unconscious, the Imaginal Realm, and Human Evolution

Psychoanalyst Carl Jung developed a theory of the unconscious mind which he felt had relevance to the UFO phenomenon. As described by Jung:

In addition to our immediate consciousness, which is of a thoroughly personal nature ... there exists a second psychic system of a collective, universal, and impersonal nature which is identical in all individuals. This collective unconscious does not develop individually but is inherited. It consists of pre-existent forms, the archetypes, which can only become conscious secondarily and which give definite form to certain psychic contents. [Jung, 1936, p. 60]

Jung (1959) suggested that some "flying saucer" sightings might be a manifestation of archetypal imagery associated with this collective unconscious. (He acknowledged there may be a physical basis to some reports as well.) Grosso (1985) has argued that the abduction experience itself is a product of the collective unconscious.

Specifically, Grosso regards abduction experiences as the collective unconscious' symbolic (archetypal) response to environmental imperatives. (That is, human exploitation and irresponsibility in regard to an endangered planet take on symbolic form as unsympathetic aliens determined to exploit us in order to revitalize their own dying species.) In turn, he sees these experiences as a driving force behind evolution of the human psyche.

Ring (1992) finds Grosso's ideas highly relevant to his own study of close-encounter experiences. Like Grosso, Ring regards such experiences as evidence for the evolution of consciousness. More specifically, he sees them as "helping to develop our latent capacities for imaginal perception" (p. 240). Ring's use of the term imaginal should not be confused with imaginary. The distinction between the terms stems from the work of Corbin (1972) who hypothesized the existence of an alternate reality accessed by visionaries and mystics during altered states of consciousness. Corbin describes this world as ontologically real, that is, as real or more real than that experienced during everyday consciousness. Ring argues that abduction experiences come from contact with this imaginal realm, and that "it can be expected that over time the evolutionary momentum [associated with these experiences] will establish and stabilize these imaginal domains as our shared reality." (p. 240)

Ring and Grosso are not the only students of ufology to argue for a connection between UFO phenomena, other realities, and evolutionary forces. Thompson (1991) sees archetypal imagery in UFO encounters. McKenna (1987) suggests that "the extraterrestrial is the human oversoul in its general and particular expression on the planet" (p. 17). Strieber (in Dabb & Langevin, 1990), considers the aliens as "midwifing our birth into the nonphysical world -- which is their origin," and representative of "an evolutionary step beyond ours which has emerged into our world as a result of actions on the non-physical plane" (p.4 1). Vallee (1990) suggests that "in a Jungian interpretation ... the human unconscious could be projecting ahead of itself the imagery which is necessary for our own long-term survival beyond the unprecedented crises of the 20th century" (p. 116). Mack (1994) concludes that "the abduction phenomenon, it seems clear, is about what is yet to come. It presents, quite literally, visions of alternative futures" (p. 422). And physicist Wolf (1994) takes the position that:

UFO experiences are from the imaginal realm and therefore have a different but "real" feeling to them as compared to ordinary experiences.... They are not the same as so called solid-reality experiences that we commonly experience in everyday life. I am also not saying they are fantasies or hallucinations. [Wolf, 1994, p. 371]

Rather, Wolf regards this manifestation of the imaginal realm as related to the quantum-mechanical nature of reality, in which the interplay of consciousness and the physical world is theoretically codependent.

Despite the obvious appeal these Jungian and quantum-mechanical concepts have for those who feet uncomfortable with both the physical and the imaginary interpretations of the abduction experience, it must be kept in mind that these notions are abstract theoretical models, not descriptions of existing experimental data. In point of fact, the ideas of a collective unconscious (especially a rapidly or intragenerationally evolving one), the imaginal realm, and the extrapolation of quantum-mechanical theory to events beyond the subatomic world (i.e., their intrusion into everyday conscious experience) are themselves highly speculative. Certainly, their application to the abduction phenomenon is also highly speculative.