A.I.C.

THE ABDUCTION EXPERIENCE: A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THEORY AND EVIDENCE

Part 4

 STUART APPELLE

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(e) Altered States of Consciousness

Evans (1989) has suggested that various altered states of consciousness (highway hypnosis, out-of-body experiences, etc.) may account for UFO abduction experiences. This scenario accounts for the emergence of unconscious material into consciousness as a function of the unique characteristics of the altered state. Bullard (1987) describes eleven cases (out of the 270 he evaluated) in which the abduction experience begins without any apparent intervention by UFOs or entities and which may be characterized as primarily or entirely mental. For example, in one case (case #209) the experiencer reported physical interaction and communication with an alien abductor for a period of time during which the experiencer remained in the presence of fully conscious investigators (who observed no attempted abduction in progress). Bullard refers to such cases as "psychic abductions" during which the altered state:

may trigger awareness of ... ferment underway in the unconscious. These conditions weaken conscious self-control and preoccupation with external events so a witness takes notice of his inner self and the world of mysterious contents awaiting him there. The witness slips into this [altered state] ... unprepared to believe that [this is] responsible for the vivid, weird pseudo-reality of the experience. [Bullard, 1987, p. 361]

However valid the altered-state explanation may be for some abduction experiences, Bullard's cases represent just 4% of his sample. It is unlikely that altered states account for a significant proportion of abduction reports.

ENVIRONMENTAL THEORIES

(a) Tectonic Stress and "Earth Lights"

Devereux (1989) and Persinger (1990) have argued that "anomalous luminous phenomena" (ALP) are propagated by stresses and strains within the earth's crust, and that these products of tectonic stress are often reported as UFOs. Persinger (1990) has related this theory of tectonic stress to a theory of neurophysiological susceptibility to electromagnetic fields. According to this theory, electromagnetic fields are capable of affecting human brain activity, particularly in the temporal lobes. Because of this, any event or condition that induces stimulation of the temporal lobes (including ALP and other electromagnetic phenomena) may lead to anomalous experiences and memory, especially in individuals who display characteristics of enhanced temporal-lobe lability. Persinger suggests that this relationship can not only explain UFO sightings, but abduction experiences as well:

Anomalous experiences that comprise contactee and abduction reports are correlated with enhanced activity within the temporal lobes of the human brain.... The personalities of normal people who display enhanced temporal lobe activity are dominated by.... a rich fantasy or subjective world.... more frequent experiences of a sense of presence ... [and] exotic beliefs.... Because ALP generated by tectonic strain could affect the brain of the nearby observer, some abduction and contactee experiences might be attributable to this source." [Persinger, 1990, pp. 129-131).

In support of his theory, Persinger has attempted to simulate the effects of temporal-lobe excitation by inducing magnetic fields applied directly to a subject's head. One description of the results of such a procedure has been presented by research psychologist Blackmore (1994) who served as a subject in Persinger's laboratory. Blackmore experienced unusual physical sensations (such as being yanked up by the shoulders or having limbs pulled), emotional states (anger, fear), and alterations in consciousness (disorientation). Although these experiences do not have the specific structure and organization of an abduction experience, both Blackmore and Persinger would argue they provide the raw material from which (embellished through various cognitive processes) classic abduction experiences might be created.

This hypothesized relationship between abduction experiences and electromagnetic fields is intriguing, but several factors greatly reduce its status as a potential explanation. First, the merits of the tectonic stress theory have been widely questioned (e.g., Grosso, 1990; Jacobs, 1990; Long, 1990; Rutkowski, 1984, 1990, 1994), both in regard to the interpretation of evidence claimed to support it, and in regard to the theoretical bases for the hypothesis itself.

Second, because the energy characteristics of ALP (especially their energy properties at a distance) are largely unknown, it is not known whether the hypothesized relationship between ALP and human brain activity is even possible. Persinger (1990) notes:

The experimental procedure that evokes experiences most similar to the more extreme UFO encounters is the electrical stimulation associated with neurosurgery. It involves very focal current induction (about 1 cc) within the brain. These similarities suggest that the magnetic fields associated with ALP involve highly localized, fluxline-like distributions of energy. [Persinger, 1990, p. 131]

Persinger's guess about ALP notwithstanding, until the energy characteristics of ALP have actually been determined, their potential for inducing abduction experiences cannot be ascertained.

Finally, the hypothesized correlation between abduction experiencers and temporal-lobe lability has not been confirmed. Spanos et al. (1993) assessed temporal lobe lability with the 52-item temporal-lobe subscale of the Personal Philosophy Inventory, an assessment instrument designed by Persinger and Makarec (1987) specifically to measure traits associated with temporal-lobe lability. Using Persinger and Makerec's own measure of this variable, Spanos et al. found no differences between control subjects and experiencers. This finding bears not only on the ALP hypothesis. It is also contrary to any suggestion that temporal-lobe lability, by virtue of its own spontaneous activity, may be a significant cause of abduction experiences.

(b) Allergic Reactions

Budden (1994) argues for a much wider contribution of electromagnetic events than that hypothesized by Devereux and Persinger:

The experiences of visitation by a variety of other worldly beings ... are the mental and physiological products of a range of environmental illnesses.... Individuals whose bodily systems are severely affected are given spontaneous warnings that their health is at risk, or even better, are cured at a stroke and transformed by events which overtake them. These are called close encounter experiences. [Budden, 1994, p. 1]

Budden's hypothesis is based on several premises:

(a) The environment (or more specifically, "electronic and electrical pollution") is a significant health hazard;

(b) This health hazard creates allergic sensitivities to nutritional and biochemical substances;

(c) Electronic pollution causes widespread hallucinatory experience (Budden estimates 20% of the population may be susceptible); and

(d) These hallucinations manifest in consciousness as symbolic representations of the health hazards being encountered.

However, Budden fails to provide a body of evidence in support of these basic premises. Instead, he presents a series of case studies in which individuals who live near apparent EM sources have had apparently hallucinatory experiences. Otherwise, he takes declarative positions without documentation. Consider the following:

[A] commonplace way [for an individual] to acquire allergies is to be in an electrical or electromagnetic field ... and during this time eat or drink something or be exposed to a common substance that they are already allergic to.... The body then 'remembers' the frequency of the field ... and when they are exposed to the same frequency again ... they react allergically .... We have therefore, a peculiar situation where there is an interchangability between food, chemical substance and electronic signal. [Budden, 1994, pp. 5-6]

For an individual whose body has had to cope with a number of nutritional, chemical, and electromagnetical assaults upon it there comes a point ... where their body will begin to give them messages .... These may begin as weird dreams that have a super-real quality to them, and develop into fully formed figures seen when the person is awake. These commonly appear beside the bed at night.... This is in fact a method by which the mind is trying to calm the allergic individual's system in a very fundamental way, thereby reducing the stress upon their body." [Budden, 1994, p. 7]

These and other assertions are presented as fact. Of course, none actually enjoys widespread acceptance or empirical support, and Budden does not help the situation by failing to provide citations for his claims. (He does provide a reference list but the specific relation between reference and claim is unclear.)

THE EXTRATERRESTRIAL (ET) HYPOTHESIS

Perhaps the most provocative explanation for abduction experiences is that they are essentially veridical reports of actual abductions by apparently extraterrestrial (ET) entities.9 Because more attention has been directed toward this hypothesis than any other, the perspectives of both advocates and detractors will be examined-tined in detail.

(a) Arguments Against the ET Hypothesis

Many critics of the ET hypothesis argue that in the absence of tangible proof, parsimony requires that the ET hypothesis be dismissed. The relationship between parsimony and evidence has been discussed already and will not be reiterated here. Other a priori arguments for dismissal are discussed below.

UFO sightings are not caused by spacecraft, so abduction experiences are not caused by aliens. It would be difficult to take the ET explanation for abduction experiences seriously without also taking the ET explanation for UFOs seriously. Therefore, dismissal of the latter has been used as a basis for dismissal of the former.

This approach maintains that the UFO evidence fails to support anything other than prosaic explanations. It is based on the observation that most sightings are at least potentially explainable as mundane phenomena (hoaxes, misperceptions of natural events, misidentification of conventional objects, secret military devices, etc.).

However, this only demonstrates that no single explanation provides a satisfying account of the sighting literature, not that prosaic explanations can explain all sightings.

In fact, global analyses of various UFO databases consistently produce a percentage of sighting reports that do not yield to any prosaic explanation (e.g., about 1/3 of all cases examined in the Air Force-commissioned Condon report, 1969). Rather than requiring dismissal of the ET hypothesis, these data require that it continue to be considered.

ETs do not exist. Although no one has proven the existence of ETs, there have been attempts to demonstrate the probability of advanced ET civilizations based on various astronomical and sociological assumptions. These efforts (Drake, 1976; Shklovskii & Sagan, 1966) generally estimate the potential number of advanced civilizations on the order of millions, if not billions. The existence of ETs is so statistically probable that their absence would be a far greater anomaly than their existence.

ETs would not be humanoid. The probability that alien beings would bear any resemblance to ourselves is seen by some observers (e.g., Dobzhansky, 1972) as exceedingly remote because evolution seems so dependent on both the specific demands of the environment and on the opportunistic characteristics of the evolutionary process. Accordingly, the humanoid description of alien abductors is considered enough in itself to disqualify abduction experiences as veridical. However, there are reasons why intelligent ETs might be expected to resemble human beings.

To begin with, the issue here is not life per se, but intelligent life that could master its environment and develop the kind of technology that would be necessary for space travel. Such beings would require personal characteristics that allow them to manipulate their environment, and an environment conducive to technological development. Swords (1989, 1995) has made a persuasive case that such an environment would necessarily be similar to our own, and that evolutionary pressures in such an environment would produce beings not dissimilar from ourselves. That is, humanoid ETs are not inconsistent with conventional theory and reports of such beings cannot be legitimately dismissed as inherently implausible.

ETs cannot get here from there. Another argument against the ET hypothesis is that interstellar distances are so formidable that the time and energy necessary to traverse them makes interstellar travel (and therefore visiting ETs) extremely unlikely (Horowitz, 1994). However, these problems may not be the unavoidable obstacles they appear to be.

For example, physicist Alcubierre (1994) has "shown how, within the framework of general relativity and without the introduction of wormholes, it is possible to modify a spacetime in a way that allows a spaceship to travel ... faster than the speed of light as seen by observers outside the disturbed region" (p. L73). That is, by reducing the distance to be covered rather than increasing acceleration the problem of distance is obviated without violating any laws of nature as we currently understand them; and because light would be traveling in space-time along with the traveler, no time dilation would be experienced. In addition, Szpir (1994) has elaborated on the possibility of circumventing the energy requirements associated with such an effort. Of course, the technological problems necessary to implement this scheme may prove insurmountable. But it seems premature to discount the feasibility of space travel within the constructs of accepted physical theory.

ETs would establish overt contact. The fact that abduction reports describe covert rather than overt contact is seen by some (e.g., Baker, 1989) as evidence against the veridicality of these reports. In prototypical form, the question raised is "Why don't they land on the White House lawn?" (This question implicitly assumes that if they did, the White House would tell us about it.)

But by what standards should we predict alien agendas? The "anthropomorphic fallacy" (the assumption that we can attribute the behavior of other animals to human motives and feelings) is well known among behavioral psychologists as an error in reasoning. Certainly, the same caution should apply to speculation about alien behaviors. That notwithstanding, there are reasons consistent with human behavior as to why an alien civilization might not want overt contact. (To name just two: We may be subjects of a research protocol that overt contact would violate; they may be up to no good and don't want us to know about it.) The argument that abduction reports must be dismissed because the reputed behavior is not overt is based on fallacious reasoning or, at best, limited imagination.

Moreover, it by no means represents a consensus of contemporary thought. Rodeghier (1996) surveyed over 500 scientists (members of professional organizations in astronomy, evolution science, geology, psychology, and zoology) and found that about 38% regarded the probability "that an extraterrestrial civilization successful at interstellar space travel, having discovered Earth, will refrain from overt contact with humans" as at least .50. That is, they regard it at least as likely that aliens would refrain from overt contact than engage in it.

(b) Arguments in Support of the ET Explanation

Proponents of the ET hypothesis take the position that a veridical interpretation of the abduction experience is, at least, not inconsistent with the reported characteristics of the phenomenon, and that in the absence of empirical support for more parsimonious theories, its consideration is not inappropriate. Furthermore, they point to a number of features of the abduction experience as supporting the ET hypothesis. These features are discussed below.

Abduction accounts are consistent. Those who argue for the veridicality of abduction experiences cite the consistency of the accounts, down to very specific details. For example, Jacobs (1992) regards "the strongest evidence presented [to be] ... the congruence of narrative and the richness of exact detail" (p. 239). While individual investigators such as Jacobs have documented this detail in regard to their own cases, Bullard (1987, 1994) has compared cases from a wide range of investigators. Based on his exhaustive analysis of abduction experience content, Bullard (1987) concluded:

The list of resemblances and recurrences goes on and on to build an impressive case for the one point this study proves beyond a reasonable doubt-abduction reports tell a consistent story. No accident, random hoax or purely personal fantasy could reasonably explain so much consistency throughout this sizable body of reports. [Bullard, 1987, p. 353]

In a more recent analysis, Bullard (1994) notes that both prominent aspects and obscure elements of the abduction experience recur across investigators: "The range of differences among major features and main patterns is quite narrow.... Abduction reports seem to converge toward a unity of content irrespective of the investigator" (p. 615).

Although consistency is well documented, the source of this consistency is a subject of debate. Critics of the ET hypothesis are quick to point out that the abduction experience has had so much media exposure, and fictional depictions of aliens are so rife in our culture, that the raw material for fantasy production is readily available. For example, Kottmeyer (1989) describes numerous instances in which fictional material is consistent with reported abduction experiences, including UFO characteristics, alien descriptions, genetic experimentation, implants, and alien motivations.

Notwithstanding, the argument that this material is the source of fantasy production requires that fantasy is itself a reasonable explanation for the abduction experience. As discussed previously, the data do not support this contention.

Regardless, it is not consistency per se that has grabbed the attention of researchers, but the implicit notion that this consistency is much greater than would be expected by chance. For example, Mack (1994) refers to "the high degree of consistency of detailed abduction accounts" (p. 43). But "high" relative to what? Jacobs (1992) refers to "the extraordinary convergence of the abductee narratives" (p. 302). But by what yardstick is this convergence extraordinary?

Certainly the standard of measure cannot be subjective impression. That measure of chance is notoriously inconsistent with empirical reality. Rather, chance must be determined by statistical tests of probability. To determine chance in regard to abduction content, one need only compare formal abduction accounts with those solicited from a random sample of the population (a control group). The Lawson (1977), Randles (1994a) and Lynn and Pezzo (1994) experiments discussed earlier are attempts at this. As previously mentioned, none represents a definitive analysis of relative consistency, and their results demonstrate consistencies and inconsistencies alike. Nevertheless, their findings at least suggest caution in using content consistency as a criterion for abduction-experience veridicality.

One argument that has been raised in response to this plea for caution is that very specific content-not well known outside the investigator community-also appears in a frequency that could not be expected by chance. For instance, Jacobs (1992) refers to "many other abduction procedures [which] have never been publicized or written about even in the most esoteric UFO literature, yet virtually all abductees describe them" (p. 302). Of course, it is precisely this absence of reference in the literature that makes an evaluation of such content impossible.

Perhaps one example of this seemingly unique content is revealed in Bullard's (1994) survey, which indicates that several investigators have obtained reports of specific alien insignia (for example, a phoenix or winged serpent). But since no one has asked a population of control subjects to suggest (imagine) a motif for such insignia, nor tabulated the precise proportion of abduction experiencers who report this motif (relative to those who report insignia of any kind), it is not known if the probability of such specific content is indeed beyond chance expectation. Until such tests are carried out, the significance of abduction-report consistency will remain a matter of subjective impression.

Physical symptoms are indicative of actual abductions. Abduction experiencers often report marks on the body, or other physical symptoms they suspect may be associated with an actual abduction event. Not uncommonly, these are (at least apparently) mundane conditions such as blemishes, bruises, nosebleeds, and familiar discomforts. In other cases, more serious or unusual skin rashes or other markings are reported. And in still other cases, serious scars of unknown (unremembered) origin are present.

These conditions have been considered by some as evidence of alien abduction procedures. Mack (1994) regards "the physical changes and lesions affecting the bodies of experiencers" as a critical factor in understanding the abduction experience. Hopkins et al. (1992) regard the existence of "puzzling scars on [the] body without remembering how or where they were acquired" as a "key indicator" of the "event-level reality of UFO abductions Jacobs (1992) criticizes alternative explanations of the abduction experience as failing to "explain the unusual physical effects apparently derived from the abduction event" (p. 302).

Rightly or wrongly, most of these "symptoms" can be easily dismissed as having a mundane origin. It is more difficult to dismiss serious scars in this way. Given the sometimes inaccessible locations for these scars, their stereotypical appearance as "scoop-marks," and their initial discovery early in childhood, such mundane explanations may not suffice. One critical issue is the extent to which serious scars may exist without recollection of their origin. According to a Roper survey (Hopkins et al., 1992), 8% of the general population report such scars. According to Bullard's investigator survey (1994), at least 25% of the experiencer population report such a condition. It is not clear how accurate Bullard's investigators' estimates may be (or even if the investigators independently verified their experiencers' claims). But if the estimates are correct, this does indeed represent a much greater prevalence of forgotten scars in the experiencer population than in the general population.

Abduction experiencers show signs of PTSD. Although PTSD is understood as a response to stressful life experiences, it may be impossible to determine whether such experiences are objectively real or imaginary (Laibow and Lane, 1993; Wilson, 1990), or whether the precipitating stressor is itself veridically recalled. Accordingly, the presence of PTSD symptomatology is not evidence that abduction experiences are veridical.

The abduction experience explains the covert nature of UFO activity. As mentioned before, it is hard to imagine acceptance of abduction reports as veridical without concomitant acceptance of UFOs as spacecraft. And certainly, a secret alien agenda provides a rationale for ET visitation without overt contact. Essentially, the reasoning here is that abduction experiences must be real because UFOs are real, and UFOs must be real because abductions are. However, this argument uses each proposition as both premise and conclusion. As such it must be rejected on logical grounds.

Abduction experiences are subjectively valid and emotionally compelling. As emotionally compelling as an abduction experience may be (to both the experiencer and the investigator or therapist listening to the experiencer's account) it has been well documented that emotional validity is not an accurate criterion of objective validity (see earlier discussion).

Abduction experiences are shared within families and across generations. Although experiencers often report that family members have had abduction or UFO-related experiences, there are two reasons why this fact cannot be regarded as evidence of the veridicality of such experiences. First, the reliability of such correlations have been difficult to establish (Haines, 1994b). Second, although a familial linkage could be consistent with real abductions, familial linkage exists for personality, psychopathology, sleep disorders, and environments. Each of these has also been suggested as a cause of the abduction experience. Therefore, even when properly documented, such relationships cannot distinguish among these alternatives.

Abduction experiences are not random. They occur to the same individuals repeatedly. The nonrandom nature of the phenomenon must certainly be a clue to the cause of the abduction experience. However, personality, psychopathology, sleep disorders, environments, and other suggested causes of the abduction experience could also lead to multiple experiences for the same individual. The nonrandom nature of the experience is no more consistent with the veridicality of the reports than with these alternative explanations.

Children's abduction experiences suggest veridicality. Abduction experiences have been reported by very young children. Kerth and Haines (I 992) have shown that the content of these reports differs from the imaginative productions solicited from nonexperiencer children. It has been argued that this is particularly difficult to explain in prosaic terms.

For example, Mack (1994) cites "the reports of abductions by children as young as two or three years of age" (p. 43) as one of the five critical aspects of the abduction experience in need of explanation. Hopkins (1994) has devised a picture-recognition test (comprised of a stereotypical alien face and character depictions from popular popular culture) to "serve as an aid in confirming or disconfirming" (p. 131) abduction experiences.

However, children's reports may not be the challenge to conventional theory that some believe. Ceci and colleagues have carried out a program of research which "suggests that source misattribution could be a mechanism underlying children's false beliefs about having experienced fictitious events" (Ceci, Loftus, Leichtman, & Bruck, 1994, p. 304). Source misattribution refers to the conviction or claim of remembering something which in reality was only thought about, or suggested by others. Ceci et al. cite a body of evidence which shows that "all children are susceptible to making source misattributions, [but] very young children may be disproportionately vulnerable" (p. 304). This susceptibility exists "even when the topic involves reporting specific and personal things ... such as alleged genital touching" (p. 305).

Moreover, in studies using videotapes of both real and fictitious (misattributed) accounts, professional researchers and clinicians performed no better than chance at distinguishing among the children's narratives. Indeed, these professionals "found it difficult to imagine such plausible, internally coherent narratives being fabricated" (p. 316). Ceci et al. conclude:

These findings suggest that it is possible to mislead preschoolers into believing that they experienced fictional events, and to do so with increasing conviction and vividness over time. An examination of the children's videotaped statements reveals internally coherent, detailed, yet false, narratives. Adults who were naive to the validity of the children's claims about fictional events often professed confidence in their accuracy. Thus it is not only possible to mislead children, but also to fool adults who are unaware of their experimental history. [Ceci et al., 1994, p. 315]

Clearly then, a researcher's or clinician's intuitive sense about a child's testimony (let alone the intuitive sense of the child's parents) says nothing about the validity of that testimony. And the testimony's detail, coherence, or consistency with adult testimony, is of significance only in regard to the child's opportunity for misattribution. As difficult as it may be to document such influence, a child's exposure to books, movies, television, the media, and the casual conversations of parents, peers, teachers, and the occasional stranger, provide more than ample opportunity for misattribution to occur. Parental assurance that their child had no opportunity for exposure to such influences is naive, or at best unfalsifiable. In addition, a perhaps counterintuitive finding from recent research (Brainerd, Reyna, & Brandse, 1995) suggests that false memories acquired by children may even be more persistent (retained over time) than true memories. In any case, the argument that children's abduction testimony is somehow less assailable than that of adults does not seem to be defensible on scientific grounds.

Multiple-witness cases indicate a real event. Numerous reports exist in the literature where an abduction experience has been shared by two or more individuals. Some of these cases are celebrated as abduction "classics," such as the Betty and Barney Hill case (Fuller, 1966). Others, while not having achieved such status, are extremely well documented (e.g., the Buff Ledge incident investigated by Webb, 1994; the Allagash incident investigated by Fowler, 1993). Carpenter (1991) and Haines (1994) have provided content analyses of other multiple abduction reports.

In some cases (e.g., Betty and Barney Hill), the individuals involved were family members or very close friends. Such relationships could allow for Shared Psychotic Disorder, a psychiatric condition described in the DSM IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) as the adoption of the delusional (psychotic) beliefs of one individual by another individual with whom a close relationship exists. Typically, such relationships are characterized as long-standing and involving individuals who have lived together for a long time-perhaps in social isolation-and where the individual with the initial psychosis is the dominant partner in the relationship.

Although this may seem to be a plausible explanation for shared abduction experiences, the disorder is quite rare and must involve not just one, but two or more individuals who have acquired a psychotic disorder. Given the normality of the experiencer population in general, the likelihood of mental disorder accounting for the abduction experience should decrease as the number of individuals sharing the experience increases. Furthermore, in most shared abduction experience cases, the relationship of the individuals involved simply does not fit the profile associated with the disorder.

For example, in the Buff Ledge case (Webb, 1994) the two primary experiencers (as well as a number of subsidiary witnesses) were acquaintances at a summer camp, shared little detail regarding their conscious experiences with each other or anyone else, became aware of their own participation in an apparent abduction only many years later during hypnosis, were unaware of the specific events described by their counterparts, had not been in contact with each other for years or even decades, and have remained anonymous making no attempt whatever to capitalize on their reported experiences.

Such experiences cannot readily be attributed to hoax, susceptibility to suggestion, or psychopathology. These cases may provide the greatest challenge to prosaic explanations of the abduction experience.