A.I.C.

---

THE ABDUCTION EXPERIENCE: A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THEORY AND EVIDENCE

 STUART APPELLE

Department of Psychology

State University of New York College at Brockport, Brockport, NY 14420-2977

 

ABSTRACT: Prevalent hypotheses regarding the etiology of the abduction experience are examined, especially in regard to the existing evidence. Deception, suggestibility (fantasy-proneness, hypnotizability, false-memory syndrome), personality, sleep phenomena, psychopathology, psychodynamics, environmental factors, and event-level alien encounters are each considered as origins of the abduction experience. The data are discussed in terms of what is and is not consistent with theory, the concept of parsimony, and the need for converging lines of evidence in establishing linkages between fact and theory. On the basis of this analysis, it is argued that no theory yet enjoys enough empirical support to be accepted as a general explanation for the abduction experience. The concept of the abduction experience as a multicausal phenomenon is discussed, and suggestions for future research are provided.

The "abduction experience"2 is characterized by subjectively real memories of being taken secretly and/or against one's will by apparently nonhuman entities and subjected to complex physical and psychological procedures.3 The number of such experiences has been estimated by Jacobs (1992) as 5-6% of the population, and by Hopkins, Jacobs, and Westrum (1992) as 2% of the population. More conservative estimates may be derived by counting the actual number of cases that have been reported by investigators. For example, Bullard's (1994) survey of 13 investigators yielded 1,700 cases. Whatever the number, few aspects of ufology have attracted as much attention. To those who dismiss the possibility that UFOs may be spacecraft, the notion of abductions by UFO occupants is seen as inherently implausible. For those who believe that UFOs are under the control of extraterrestrials, abduction experiences suggest both a rationale for surreptitious UFO activity and an opportunity to learn about the purpose underlying such activity. In essence, the abduction experience is seen as an answer to the proverbial question, "Why don't they land on the White House lawn?"

In addition to the extraterrestrial hypothesis, there are numerous alternative explanations for the abduction experience, many of which have been actively debated in the ufological literature. However, these debates have often shed much more heat than light. The purpose of this paper is to closely examine the proposed explanations (causes) for the abduction experience in terms of their theoretical strengths and weaknesses, and more importantly, in terms of what (if any) empirical evidence exists in their support. The review does not address subsidiary issues which presuppose a particular etiology. (For example, what planets do the abductors come from?) Nor does it entertain the position advocated by some that an understanding of the abduction experience is not amenable to scientific analysis (a position with which I disagree; Appelle, 1994b).

The Rule of Parsimony and Theories of the Abduction Experience

The issue of evidence is particularly important in regard to the rule of parsimony (often referred to as Occam's razor). This maxim states that when interpreting a phenomenon, unnecessary assumptions should not be introduced. It is important to emphasize that parsimony is defined in terms of unnecessary assumptions, not in terms of unpopular assumptions, disturbing assumptions, or unconventional assumptions. As such, it can be assessed only in regard to empirical evidence, as the empirical evidence defines which assumptions are or are not necessary. A theory cannot continue to be defended on the grounds of parsimony if it has been disconfirmed through experiment, and in the absence of proper testing, parsimony by itself is of limited value in assessing a theory's validity.

An understanding of this is essential because parsimony is routinely used as the criterion against which theories of the abduction experience are compared. As these theories are examined, it should be kept in mind that parsimony is a rule by which evidence is to be evaluated. It should not be confused with evidence itself.

HOAXES

The hoax explanation suggests that reports of alien abduction are not honest descriptions of experiences, but are stories made up to deliberately deceive. It is generally assumed that the motivation for such deception lies in the opportunity for monetary or psychosocial reward afforded by such stories. These opportunities certainly exist. Books recounting abduction experiences are widely sold, and there is an active lecture circuit for individuals who report such experiences. Moreover, support groups for abduction experiencers, talk shows, and conferences provide opportunities for social interaction and celebrity that would not otherwise be available to the experiencer.

However, to take advantage of such opportunities, the abduction experiencer must go public with the experience. In the vast majority of cases there is simply nothing in the reporter's behavior that would suggest such an intention. Abduction experiencers see mental health professionals for help in coping with the experience, or they see abduction investigators to obtain or share information about the experience. But beyond this limited contact, the experiencer who goes public is a rarity (even if based on the minimal number of known cases, such as Bullard's [1994] database of 1,700 cases; based on the number of estimated cases, such as Hopkins et al. [1992], the proportion of experiencers who have gone public is even more of a rarity). Much more commonly, the experiencer desires assurance of anonymity.

On the other hand, deliberate misrepresentation can occur in the absence of normal incentives for deception. According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994), factitious disorder refers to individuals who feign physical or psychological illness where "the motivation for the behavior is to assume the sick role" (p. 474). That is, the psychological need to be a "patient" is itself symptomatic of a disorder. Where psychological symptoms predominate, the individual "may claim ... memory loss ... hallucinations ... and dissociative symptoms. These individuals may be extremely suggestible and may endorse many of the symptoms brought up during a review of symptoms" (p. 472).

Despite some parallels with abduction accounts, there are a number of characteristics of factitious disorder that make it an unlikely source of abduction hoaxes. Sufferers are likely to have an extensive history of hospitalizations or treatment interventions, be extremely resistant to giving up the role as patient, and are reluctant, vague, and inconsistent when asked to provide information in detail. These and other differential diagnoses are not characteristic of the vast majority of abduction experiencers.

In any case, no one has seriously suggested that hoaxes account for any but a few of the thousands of abduction experience reports. The hoax hypothesis has been advanced (Klass, 1988) to account for the stories of specific abduction claimants, but the sincerity (albeit not the accuracy) of most abduction experiencers is generally acknowledged even by ardent skeptics.

SUSCEPTIBILITY TO SUGGESTION

Suggestion is often proposed as the cause of the abduction experience. This hypothesis has taken a number of different forms. Hypnotizability refers to a talent for accepting suggestions offered during hypnosis. Fantasy proneness refers to a personality trait characterized by a predisposition to engage in compelling, imaginative experience. The false-memory syndrome refers to the influence of suggestion during the course of therapy. Central to each of these constructs is the notion that imagined events can be experienced as historical events.

(a) Hypnotic Memory and Hypnotizability

Hypnosis involves procedures designed to maximize a subject's ability to respond to suggestion. Hypnotic suggestions to go back in time and remember or relive past events have been widely used as a method for retrieving or enhancing memory. This notwithstanding, in controlled experiments hypnotically enhanced memory is at best only modestly demonstrated. Instead, an increase in pseudomemories (an effect that escalates with increased pressure to recall), increased confidence in the validity of one's pseudomemories, and increased susceptibility to suggestion or leading questions are more generally the rule. (See Farthing, 1992; Smith, 1983 for typical reviews of this literature.)

In theory, therefore, hypnosis should have a greater potential to create abduction experiences than to retrieve them. This is particularly troublesome given that many more abduction reports have emerged in the course of hypnosis than through spontaneous recall (Bullard, 1987, 1994). As such, it is not surprising that critics of the abduction phenomenon cite the scientific literature on hypnosis as grounds for dismissing hypnotically retrieved accounts of alien abduction (e.g., Baker, 1990, 1992; Klass, 1988). An evaluation of this argument follows.

Applicability of hypnosis research to the abduction experience. If hypnotic memory in general is suspect, then hypnotically retrieved memory of abductions must be suspect as well. However, this assumption depends on the extent to which the experimental situation is comparable to that associated with the abduction experience (Appelle, 1994a).

Studies that are used to generalize to the abduction experience should involve source (retrieval) materials that are like the abduction experience in quality. Abduction memories are characterized by dynamic, emotionally charged events that instill trauma, fear, anxiety, confusion, and anger. Moreover, they are characterized by events so unusual as to be outside the range of normal human experience.

In contrast, the bulk of laboratory research has used static and neutral source material such as memorized lists of words. Some studies have used more relevant materials for retrieval such as stress-inducing stimuli (DePiano & Salzberg, 1981; Zelig & Beidleman, 1981), or simulations of emotionally charged events like accidents or crimes (Brigham, Maass, Snyder, & Spaulding, 1982; Malpass & Devine, 1980; Sanders & Wamick, 1981). The results of these studies are entirely consistent with those using more mundane materials. However, they still fail to reproduce the "strangeness" of abduction experiences, or the range and magnitude of emotional states associated with reported abductions.

Moreover, the efficacy of hypnosis in enhancing recall should be related not only to the kind of material to be retrieved, but also to the cause of forgetting (decay, interference, repression, psychological trauma, physical trauma, etc.). Surprisingly, there exists virtually no research on this issue. For example, there are no systematic investigations of the accuracy or efficacy of hypnotic recall in trauma-induced amnesia. This is unfortunate, because anecdotal reports and case studies regarding recall of traumatic events abound in both the forensic and clinical literature, and provide much of the basis for the belief in hypnotic hypermnesia.

Of course, we do not know if the abduction experience follows trauma-induced amnesia. First, this presupposes actual forgetting of some real event (as opposed to an hypnotically created pseudomemory). Second, it presupposes experienced trauma (either to an actual abduction or to some other event for which the recalled abduction is a screen memory). Third, as will be discussed later, the very concepts of repression and dissociative amnesia are controversial (Loftus, 1993; Ofshe & Singer, 1994).

There is an additional problem in regard to hypnosis and the mechanisms of forgetting. Real alien abductions might be forgotten because of yet unidentified processes (as suggested by the numerous reports by abduction experiencers of alien mind control). The applicability of hypnosis research to unknown mechanisms cannot, of course, be evaluated.

General hypnotizability. To whatever extent hypnosis may cause false experiences of alien abduction, its potential to do so should increase as a subject's susceptibility to hypnotic suggestion increases.

Rodeghier, Goodpaster, and Blatterbauer (1991) assessed hypnotic responsiveness in a group of abduction experiencers with the Creative Imagination Scale (Wilson & Barber, 1978). This instrument evaluates subjects ability to vividly imagine suggested scenes and situations. The authors found that, as a group, abduction experiencers were no more susceptible to hypnotic suggestion than the general population.

Spanos, Cross, Dickson, and Dubreuil (1993) used the Carleton University Responsiveness to Suggestion Scale (Spanos, Radtke, Hodgins, Stam, & Bertrand, 1983) to measure hypnotizability. This test measures three dimensions of hypnotizability: number of items to which an appropriate response is made, extent to which the subjective effects called for are experienced, and the degree to which subjects' responses are perceived as involuntary. The researchers found that their experiencer population was no different from the controls on any of these measures.

Specific hypnotizability. In a recent survey of investigators and mental health practitioners, Bullard (1994) found that "nine out of ten respondents stated that many or most of their [abduction experiencer subjects are easy to hypnotize" (p. 575). Bullard's interpretation is that his "survey sample of abductees appears especially rich in people of high susceptibility to hypnosis" (p. 575).

As noted above, however, this position is not supported by formal tests of hypnotizability. These subjects may be highly hypnotizable in sessions dedicated to exploring their abduction experiences, but they are not highly hypnotizable per se. This may not be as paradoxical as it seems. Orne, Whitehouse, Orne, & Dinges (1996) have argued that the combined effects of relaxation, therapist-hypnotist validation, and repetitive probing create a situation in which "individuals can be considerably more affected by hypnotic procedures than their behaviorally anchored ratings of hypnotical ability would suggest" (p. 170).

Alternatively, the discrepancy between hypnosis scores and the ease in soliciting abduction accounts may mean that something about the abduction experience itself makes it particularly susceptible to hypnotic procedures. In fact, research has identified several factors that may contribute to this situation.

First, hypnotic recall improves when the material to be remembered is meaningful to the individual (Shields & Knox, 1986), when the emotional, physical, and cognitive conditions of the original experience are hypnotically reinstated (Anderson, 1990), and as context for the event is more highly integrated with the memory to be retrieved (Eich, 1985). These conditions are common to hypnotic regression for the abduction experience.

Second, research on state-dependent learning suggests that returning to the state of consciousness in which an experience originally occurred may improve recall. For example, returning to a state of alcohol (Goodwin, Powell, Bremmer, Hoine, & Stem, 1969) or marijuana (Eich, Weingartner, Stillman, & Gillin, 1975) intoxication, or the influence of stimulants (Swanson & Kinsbourne, 1976) improves recall of events that originally occurred during those conditions. If hypnosis produces a mental state that in any way resembles the state during which an abduction is originally experienced, recall for that experience could be enhanced. Some abduction experiencers have described a mental state for the remembered event (e.g., Webb, 1994) that is not unlike that reported by other subjects for the experience of being hypnotized.

Finally, the literature on hypnosis has provided some evidence that information not previously available to consciousness can be retrieved hypnotically. For example, hypnotic recall has been reported for stimuli presented subliminally (Kunzendorf, Lacourse, & Lynch, 1987) or during general anesthesia (Cheek, 1959, 1964; Levinson, 1965). Although this research is itself controversial, it implies that information registered outside of normal conscious awareness may be accessed during hypnosis. Abduction experiencers often describe knowledge apparently acquired in this way.

These considerations suggest a basis for the specific hypnotizability obtained for abduction experiences. This should not, however, be confused with an argument for the veridicality of abduction experiences. The factors discussed certainly apply to real events, but they could also apply to experiences originating in the imagination or unconscious. This possibility must remain at the status of conjecture, however, because there can be no direct evidence that a conscious experience had heretofore resided in the unconscious.

Nevertheless, it may be useful to consider this possibility in regard to other anomalous experiences proposed to have imaginative or unconscious antecedents. Like abduction experiences, past-life identities (reincarnations) are also easily elicited through hypnosis from normal individuals (Kampman, 1976), are rich in detail, and are believed by the experiencer as veridical recall of actual past events (Spanos, Burgess, & Burgess, 1994). Spanos et al. argue that both hypnotic abduction experiences and past lives (as well as elicited memories of satanic ritual abuse and multiple personalities) are "social creations ... determined by the understandings that subjects develop about such experiences from the information to which they are exposed" (p. 436). Whether or not this interpretation is correct, the role of hypnosis may be elucidated through a consideration of abduction experiences in relationship to other anomalous experiences routinely accessible to the hypnotized subject.

Simulations of the abduction experience. Lawson (1977) asked hypnotized subjects to describe events associated with a suggested close encounter with a UFO. He claimed considerable similarity between these reports and those from real abduction experiencers. This study has been widely cited by skeptics but widely criticized by ufologists (Bullard, 1989) for its methodology, conclusions, and generalizability. Whatever its validity, it remains the only direct test of the role of hypnosis in the abduction experience.4

Lynn and colleagues describe a related experiment (Lynn & Pezzo, 1994; Lynn & Kirsch, 1996). Testing the premise that similarities found across abduction experiences can be accounted for by familiarity with these elements in our popular culture, they reasoned that encounter scenarios deliberately and consciously made up by non-abduction-experiencers should approximate those generated by actual abduction experiencers. To test this, volunteers were asked to simulate (role play) the behavior of an excellent hypnotic subject asked to recall events following the observation of a mysterious light in the sky. (The subjects were not actually hypnotized.) Like Lawson, these experimenters report certain (yet sketchy) similarities between their subjects' accounts and those typically found in the abduction experience literature.

On the other hand, Randles (1994a) noted a number of inconsistencies between the prototypical abduction experience and the stories of twenty British subjects asked to imagine a close encounter. These inconsistencies included more humanlike entities, almost no reports of "doorway amnesia" (failure to recall events associated with entry into the abductors' craft), not a single medical examination, and little resemblance of apparent alien motives to those indicated in the reports by actual abduction experiencers.

Although these results seem contradictory to those of Lawson and Lynn and Pezzo, it is interesting to note that compared to the stereotypical American abduction scenario, British abduction experiencers report humanlike entities about four times more often, and medical examinations about 1/3 as often (Randles, 1994b). Therefore, the results with British subjects who are asked to make up a close encounter are more consistent with the typical British abduction report than might otherwise be apparent.

Each of these studies could benefit from tighter methodology and closer examination of the content and frequency of the generated reports. In the meantime, however, they suggest that elements of the abduction experience are found in the imaginations of the nonexperiencer population, and that consistency in abduction accounts is becoming more difficult to justify as evidence of veridicality.

Influence of hypnosis and hypnotists. Abduction narratives can be compared to determine if they vary according to the particular theoretical inclinations of the investigator or therapist eliciting the account. Also, accounts which emerge during hypnosis can be compared with those stemming from conscious experience. Such analyses have been carried out by Bullard (1989, 1994). On the basis of his findings, Bullard (1989) concluded that "the form and content of abduction stories seems independent of hypnosis" (p. 3). In a more recent examination, Bullard (1994) concludes that hypnosis is a significant factor in regard to the quantity of material "recovered," but not in any direct way to the content.

(b) Fantasy Proneness

The concept of fantasy proneness developed out of a line of research designed to find personality traits that correlate with hypnotizability. Among highly hypnotizable subjects, Wilson and Barber (1981, 1983b) identified a group of individuals who could hallucinate voluntarily, have imaginary experiences that are subjectively as real as nonfantasized events, and who occasionally had difficulty distinguishing memories of fantasized events from those which actually happened. Wilson and Barber called these subjects "fantasy prone."

Theoretical issues. Fantasy proneness is theoretically relevant to the abduction experience both as a source of imaginative experience, and because of similarities between the experiences of fantasy-prone persons and those of abduction experiencers. For example, the fantasy prone report a high incidence of false pregnancies, psychic and out-of-body experiences, apparitions, and vivid sleep imagery which feels "as if they are seeing something that really exists out there or that they are looking into another dimension" (Wilson & Barber, 1981, p. 365). These experiences have parallels with those reported by abduction experiencers (Bullard, 1987, 1994), suggesting that abduction experiencers and the fantasy prone may belong to the same population.

Moreover, the elicitation of imaginative abduction experiences might be exacerbated in situations where the emergence is hypnotically assisted. Wilson and Barber (1981) found that the fantasy prone represented 96% of their highly hypnotizable subjects, and described their response to hypnotic suggestions as "the kind of thing they can do independently ... in their daily lives" (Wilson and Barber, 1983b, p. 377).

However, subsequent research has shown this finding to be misleading. Although a relationship between fantasy proneness and hypnotizability has generally been supported, the relationship appears to be much more modest than Wilson and Barber originally reported (Lynn & Rhue, 1988). For example, Lynn, Green, Rhue, Mare, and Williams (1990) found only 12.82%-16.6% of their highly hypnotizable subjects (depending on the measure of hypnotizability) were fantasy prone (in contrast to Wilson and Barber's 96%). This discrepancy is related to whether subjects are selected on the basis of their hypnotizability or on the basis of their fantasy proneness. Fantasy-prone individuals are likely to be highly hypnotizable (they carry their everyday talents into the hypnosis situation), but highly hypnotizable individuals are not generally fantasy prone. In fact, relationships between hypnotizability and any measure of imaginative traits are actually quite small (Kirsch & Council, 1992).

Studies of abduction experiencers. Ring and Rosing (1990) compared a group of abduction experiencers and others reporting UFO encounters with a group of subjects (controls) who expressed only an interest in UFOs. Using a battery of tests they found that experiencers are not fantasy prone in any general sense. However, the encounter subjects were significantly more likely to report childhood experiences of psychic phenomena, "non-physical beings," and to "see into other realities that others didn't seem to be aware of." Each of these characteristics is consistent with fantasy-prone characteristics originally reported by Wilson and Barber.

The authors interpreted their finding as "sensitiv[ity] to non-ordinary realities," but acknowledged that the role of such sensitivities -- as causes, facilitators, or effects of encounter experiences -- cannot be determined from their study. They also acknowledged that the validity of the assessment measures they used has been largely untested, providing a further limitation on the generalizability of their findings.

In another study, Rodeghier et al. (1991) focused on subjects who met clearly defined criteria for an abduction experience. Fantasy proneness was assessed with the Inventory of Childhood Memories and Imaginings (ICMI) (Wilson & Barber, 1983a), an instrument adapted from that used by Wilson and Barber (1981 ) in their seminal study of the fantasy prone. The authors found no difference between ICMI scores for their abduction-experiencer group and that reported for a random sample of the population.

Bartholomew, Basterfield, and Howard (1991) examined over one hundred abduction experiencers and concluded that the vast majority (87%) had histories consistent with one or more of the major symptoms found in the fantasy-prone profile. However, the authors' assessed fantasy proneness by retrospective analysis of biographical data rather than an independent test for fantasy proneness; and of the reported fantasy-prone characteristics the authors examined, only the frequency of experienced psychic phenomena even approaches that found by Wilson and Barber (1981) in their fantasy-prone population.

Spanos et al. (1993) compared fantasy proneness for "intense" UFO experiencers (those reporting encounters with aliens), those reporting only observation of distant lights or objects which they interpreted as UFOs, and control subjects reporting no UFO experiences. The authors found no statistical difference across or between groups on fantasy proneness as measured by the ICMI.

They did, however, find a correlation between ICMI scores and an intensity-of-experience scale. UFO believers who were relatively fantasy prone tended to report more elaborate UFO experiences. However, this relationship must be viewed in perspective. As the authors point out, very few subjects reporting UFO-related experiences attained extreme scores on the ICMI. In fact, even for the intense-experiencer group the mean ICMI score was only 22.4, a score which is right at the midrange of that for the general population (Lynn & Rhue, 1988). Spanos et al. concluded that their "findings clearly contradict the hypotheses that UFO reports -- even intense UFO reports characterized by such seemingly bizarre experiences as missing time and communication with aliens -- occur primarily in individuals who are highly fantasy-prone" (p. 629).

As a final comment on the viability of the fantasy-prone hypothesis, an experiment testing Wilson and Barber's original description of fantasy-prone experiences as being "as real as real" is of relevance. Rhue and Lynn (1987) asked a large group of fantasy-prone subjects to hallucinate a Styrofoam cup. Although these subjects were quite successful at this task, few ascribed realistic properties to the hallucinated experience. If the fantasy prone can readily distinguish imagined stimuli from real ones, then even on theoretical grounds the fantasy-prone explanation of the abduction experience is significantly compromised.